Terrorism And Lethality
Although the total volume of terrorist incidents world-wide has declined
in the
1990s, the proportion of persons killed in terrorist incidents has
steadily
risen. For example, according to the RAND-St Andrews University
Chronology of
International Terrorism,5 a record 484 international
terrorist incidents were
recorded in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, followed
by 343 incidents in 1992,
360 in 1993, 353 in 1994, falling to 278
incidents in 1995 (the last calendar
year for which complete statistics are
available).6 However, while terrorists
were becoming less active, they were
nonetheless becoming more lethal. For
example, at least one person was killed
in 29 percent of terrorist incidents in
1995: the highest percentage of
fatalities to incidents recorded in the
Chronology since 1968--and an
increase of two percent over the previous year's
record figure.7 In the
United States this trend was most clearly reflected in
1995 bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Since
the turn of the
century, fewer than a dozen of all the terrorist incidents
committed
world-wide have killed more than a 100 people. The 168 persons
confirmed dead
at the Murrah Building ranks sixth on the list of most fatalities
caused this
centuryin a single terrorist incident--domestic or international.8
The
reasons for terrorism's increasing lethality are complex and variegated,
but
can generally be summed up as follows: The growth in the number of
terrorist
groups motivated by a religious imperative; The proliferation
of
"amateurs" involved in terrorist acts; and, The
increasing
sophistication and operational competence of
"professional"
terrorists. Religious Terrorism The increase of terrorism
motivated by a
religious imperative neatly encapsulates the confluence of new
adversaries,
motivations and rationales affecting terrorist patterns today.
Admittedly, the
connection between religion and terrorism is not new.9
However, while religion
and terrorism do share a long history, in recent
decades this form particular
variant has largely been overshadowed by ethnic-
and nationalist-separatist or
ideologically-motivated terrorism. Indeed, none
of the 11 identifiable terrorist
groups10 active in 1968 (the year credited
with marking the advent of modern,
international terrorism) could be
classified as "religious."11 Not
until 1980 in fact--as a result of the
repercussions from the revolution in Iran
the year before--do the first
"modern" religious terrorist groups
appear:12 but they amount to only two of
the 64 groups active that year. Twelve
years later, however, the number of
religious terrorist groups has increased
nearly six-fold, representing a
quarter (11 of 48) of the terrorist
organisations who carried out attacks in
1992. Significantly, this trend has not
only continued, but has actually
accelerated. By 1994, a third (16) of the 49
identifiable terrorist groups
could be classified as religious in character
and/or motivation. Last year
their number increased yet again, no to account for
nearly half (26 or 46
percent) of the 56 known terrorist groups active in 1995.
The
implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative for
higher
levels of lethality is evidenced by the violent record of various
Shi'a Islamic
groups during the 1980s. For example, although these
organisations committed
only eight percent of all recorded international
terrorist incidents between
1982 and 1989, they were nonetheless
responsible for nearly 30 percent of the
total number of deaths during that
time period.13 Indeed, some of the most
significant terrorist acts of the
past 18 months, for example, have all had some
religious element present.14
Even more disturbing is that in some instances the
perpetrators' aims have
gone beyond the establishment of some theocracy amenable
to their specific
deity,15 but have embraced mystical, almost transcendental,
and
divinely-inspired imperatives16 or a vehemently anti-government form
of
"populism" reflecting far-fetched conspiracy notions based on
a
volatile mixture of seditious, racial and religious dicta.17
Religious
terrorism18 tends to be more lethal than secular terrorism because
of the
radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation
and
justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world views that
directly
affect the "holy terrorists'" motivation. For the religious
terrorist,
violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty:
executed in
direct response to some theological demand or imperative and
justified by
scripture. Religion, therefore functions as a legitimising
force: specifically
sanctioning wide scale violence against an almost
open-ended category of
opponents (e.g., all peoples who are not members of
the religious terrorists'
religion or cult). This explains why clerical
sanction is so important for
religious terrorists19 and why religious figures
are often required to
"bless" (e.g., approve) terrorist operations before
they are executed.
"Amateur" Terrorists The proliferation of
"amateurs"
involved in terrorist acts has also contributed to terrorism's
increasing
lethality. In the past, terrorism was not just a matter of having
the will and
motivation to act, but of having the capability to do so--the
requisite
training, access to weaponry, and operational knowledge. These were
not readily
available capabilities and were generally acquired through
training undertaken
in camps known to be run either by other terrorist
organisations and/or in
concert with the terrorists' state-sponsors.20 Today,
however, the means and
methods of terrorism can be easily obtained at
bookstores, from mail-order
publishers, on CD-ROM or even over the Internet.
Hence, terrorism has become
accessible to anyone with a grievance, an agenda,
a purpose or any idiosyncratic
combination of the above. Relying on these
commercially obtainable published
bomb-making manuals and operational
guidebooks, the "amateur"
terrorist can be just as deadly and
destructive21--and even more difficult to
track and anticipate--than his
"professional" counterpart.22 In this
respect, the alleged "Unabomber,"
Thomas Kaczynski is a case in point.
From a remote cabin in the Montana
hinterland, Kaczynski is believed to have
fashioned simple, yet sophisticated
home-made bombs from ordinary materials that
were dispatched to his victims
via the post. Despite one of the most massive
manhunts staged by the FBI in
the United States, the "Unabomber" was
nonetheless able to elude
capture--much less identification--for 18 years and
indeed to kill three
persons and injure 23 others. Hence, the
"Unabomber" is an example of the
difficulties confronting law
enforcement and other government authorities in
first identifying, much less,
apprehending the "amateur" terrorist and the
minimal skills needed to
wage an effective terrorist campaign. This case also
evidences the
disproportionately extensive consequences even violence
committed by a lone
individual can have both on society (in terms of the fear
and panic sown) and on
law enforcement (because of the vast resources that
are devoted to the
identification and apprehension of this individual).
"Amateur"
terrorists are dangerous in other ways as well. In fact, the
absence of some
central command authority may result in fewer constraints on
the terrorists'
operations and targets and--especially when combined with a
religious fervour--fewer
inhibitions on their desire to inflict
indiscriminate casualties. Israeli
authorities, for example, have noted this
pattern among terrorists belonging to
the radical Palestinian Islamic Hamas
organisation in contrast to their
predecessors in the ostensibly more secular
and professional,
centrally-controlled mainstream Palestine Liberation
Organization terrorist
groups. As one senior Israeli security official noted
of a particularly vicious
band of Hamas terrorists: they "were a surprisingly
unprofessional bunch.
. . they had no preliminary training and acted without
specific
instructions."23 In the United States, to cite another example of
the
potentially destructively lethal power of amateur terrorists, it is
suspected
that the 1993 World Trade Center bombers' intent was in fact to
bring down one
of the twin towers.24 By contrast, there is no evidence that
the persons we once
considered to be the world's arch-terrorists--the
Carloses, Abu Nidals, and Abul
Abbases--ever contemplated, much less
attempted, to destroy a high-rise office
building packed with people. Indeed,
much as the inept World Trade Center
bombers were derided for their inability
to avoid arrest, their modus operandi
arguably points to a pattern of future
terrorist activities elsewhere. For
example, as previously noted, terrorist
groups were once recognisable as
distinct organisational entities. The four
convicted World Trade Center bombers
shattered this stereotype. Instead they
comprised a more or less ad hoc
amalgamation of like-minded individuals who
shared a common religion, worshipped
at the same religious institution, had
the same friends and frustrations and
were linked by family ties as well, who
simply gravitated towards one another
for a specific, perhaps even one-time,
operation.25 Moreover, since this more
amorphous and perhaps even transitory
type of group will lack the
"footprints" or modus operandi of an actual,
existing terrorist
organization, it is likely to prove more difficult for law
enforcement to get a
firm idea or build a complete picture of the dimensions
of their intentions and
capabilities. Indeed, as one New York City police
officer only too presciently
observed two months before the Trade Center
attack: it wasn't the established
terrorist groups--with known or suspected
members and established operational
patterns--that worried him, but the
hitherto unknown "splinter
groups," composed of new or marginal members from
an older group, that
suddenly surface out of nowhere to attack.26
Essentially, part-time time
terrorists, such loose groups of individuals, may
be--as the World Trade Center
bombers themselves appear to have
been--indirectly influenced or remotely
controlled by some foreign government
or non-governmental entity. The suspicious
transfer of funds from banks in
Iran and Germany to a joint account maintained
by the accused bombers in New
Jersey just before the Trade Center blast, for
example, may be illustrative
of this more indirect or circuitous foreign
connection.27 Moreover, the fact
that two Iraqi nationals--Ramzi Ahmed Yousef
(who was arrested last April in
Pakistan and extradited to the United States)
and Abdul Rahman
Yasin--implicated in the Trade Center conspiracy, fled the
United
States28 in one instance just before the bombing and in the other
shortly
after the first arrests, increases suspicion that the incident may
not only have
been orchestrated from abroad but may in fact have been an act
of
state-sponsored terrorism. Thus, in contrast to the Trade Center
bombing's
depiction in the press as a terrorist incident perpetrated by a
group of
"amateurs" acting either entirely on their own or, as one of
the
bomber's defence attorneys portrayed his client manipulated by a
"devious,
evil . . . genius"29 (Yousef), the original genesis of the Trade
Center
attack may be far more complex. This use of amateur terrorists
as
"dupes" or "cut-outs" to mask the involvement of some
foreign patron or
government could therefore greatly benefit terrorist state
sponsors who could
more effectively conceal their involvement and thus avoid
potential military
retaliation by the victim country and diplomatic or economic
sanctions from
the international community. Moreover, the prospective
state-sponsors'
connection could be further obscured by the fact that much of
the "amateur"
terrorists' equipment, resources and even funding could
be entirely
self-generating. For example, the explosive device used at the
World
Trade Center was constructed out of ordinary,
commercially-available
materials--including lawn fertiliser (urea nitrate)
and diesel fuel--and cost
less than $400 to build.30 Indeed, despite the
Trade Center bombers' almost
comical ineptitude in avoiding capture, they
were still able to shake an entire
city's--if not country's--complacency.
Further, the "simple" bomb used
by these "amateurs" proved just as deadly and
destructive--killing six
persons, injuring more than a 1,000 others, gouging
out a 180-ft wide crater six
stories deep, and causing an estimated $550
million in both damages to the twin
tower and in lost revenue to the business
housed there31--as the more
"high-tech" devices constructed out of military
ordnance, with timing
devices powered by computer micro-chips and detonated
by sophisticated timing
mechanisms used by their "professional"
counterparts.32
"Professional" Terrorists Finally, while on the one hand
terrorism is
attracting "amateurs," on the other hand the sophistication
and
operational competence of the "professional" terrorists is
also
increasing. These "professionals" are becoming demonstrably more
adept
in their trade craft of death and destruction; more formidable in
their
abilities of tactical modification, adjustment and innovation in their
methods
of attack; and appear to be able to operate for sustained periods of
time while
avoiding detection, interception and arrest or capture. More
disquieting, these
"professional" terrorists are apparently becoming
considerably more
ruthless as well. An almost Darwinian principle of natural
selection seems to
affect subsequent generations of terrorist groups, whereby
every new terrorist
generation learns from its predecessors, becoming
smarter, tougher, and more
difficult to capture or eliminate. Accordingly, it
is not difficult to recognise
how the "amateur" terrorist may become
increasingly attractive to
either a more professional terrorist group and/or
their state patron as a pawn
or "cut-out" or simply as an expendable minion.
In this manner, the
"amateur" terrorist could be effectively used by others
to further
conceal the identity of the foreign government or terrorist group
actually
commissioning or ordering a particular attack. The series of
terrorist attacks
that unfolded in France last year conforms to this pattern
of activity. Between
July and October 1995, a handful of terrorists,
using bombs fashioned with
four-inch nails wrapped around camping style
cooking-gas canisters, killed eight
persons and wounded more than 180 others.
Not until early October did any group
claim credit for the bombings, when the
radical Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a
militant Algerian Islamic organization,
took responsibility for the attacks.
French authorities, however, believe
that, while "professional"
terrorists perpetrated the initial bombings,
like-minded "amateurs"--
recruited by the GIA operatives from within France's
large and increasingly
restive Algerian expatriate community were responsible
for at least some of the
subsequent attacks.33 Accordingly, these "amateurs"
or new recruits
facilitated the campaign's "metastasising" beyond the small
cell of
professionals who ignited it, striking a responsive chord among
disaffected
Algerian youths in France and thereby increasing
exponentially the aura of fear
and, arguably, the terrorists' coercive power.
Likely Future Patterns of
Terrorism While it can be argued that the
terrorist threat is declining in terms
of the total number of annual
incidents in other, perhaps more significant
respects--e.g., both the number
of persons killed in individual terrorists
incidents and the percent of
terrorist incidents with fatalities in comparison
to total incidents--the
threat is actually rising. Accordingly, it is as
important to look at
qualitative changes as well as quantitative ones; and to
focus on generic
threat and generic capabilities based on overall trends as well
as on known
or existing groups. The pitfalls of focusing on known, identifiable
groups at
the expense of other potential, less-easily identified, more
amorphous
adversaries was perhaps most clearly demonstrated in Japan by the
attention long
paid to familiar and well-established left-wing groups like
the Japanese Red
Army or Middle Core organisation with an established
modus operandi,
identifiable leadership, etc. rather than on an obscure,
relatively unknown
religious movement, such as the Aum Shinri Kyu sect.
Indeed, the Aum sect's
nerve gas attack on the Tokyo underground34 arguably
demarcates a significant
historical watershed in terrorist tactics and
weaponry.35 This incident clearly
demonstrated that it is possible--even for
ostensibly "amateur"
terrorists--to execute a successful chemical terrorist
attack and accordingly
may conceivably have raised the stakes for terrorists
everywhere. Accordingly,
terrorist groups in the future may well feel driven
to emulate or surpass the
Tokyo incident either in death and destruction
or in the use of a
non-conventional weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in order
to ensure the same
media coverage and public attention as the nerve gas
attack generated. The Tokyo
incident also highlights another troubling trend
in terrorism: significantly,
groups today claim credit for attacks less
frequently than in the past. They
tend not to take responsibility much less
issue communiqu?s explaining why
they carried out an attack as the
stereotypical, "traditional"
terrorist group of the past did. For example, in
contrast to the 1970s and early
1980s, some of the most serious terrorist
incidents of the past
decade--including the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing--have
never been credibly
claimed--much less explained or justified as terrorist
attacks once almost
always were--by the group responsible for the attack.36
The implication of this
trend is perhaps that violence for some terrorist
groups is becoming less a
means to an end (that therefore has to be
calibrated and tailored and therefore
"explained" and "justified" to the
public) than an end in
itself that does not require any wider explanation or
justification beyond the
groups' members themselves and perhaps their
specific followers. Such a trait
would conform not only to the motivations of
religious terrorists (discussed
above) but also to terrorist
"spoilers"--groups bent on disrupting or
sabotaging multi-lateral
negotiations or the peaceful settlement of ethnic
conflicts or other such
violent disputes. That terrorists are less frequently
claiming credit for
their attacks may suggest an inevitable loosening
of
constraints--self-imposed or otherwise--on their violence: in turn leading
to
higher levels of lethality as well.37 Another key factor contributing to
the
rising terrorist threat is the ease of terrorist adaptations across
the
technological spectrum.38 For example, on the low-end of the
technological
spectrum one sees terrorists' continuing to rely on fertiliser
bombs whose
devastating effect has been demonstrated by the PIRA at St Mary
Axe and Bishop's
Gate in 1991 and 1992; at Canary Wharf and in Manchester
in 1996; by the
aforementioned World Trade Center bombers and the persons
responsible for the
Oklahoma City bombing. Fertiliser is perhaps the most
cost-effective of weapons:
costing on average one percent of a comparable
amount of plastic explosive. Its
cost-effectiveness is demonstrated by the
facts that the Bishop Gate blast is
estimated to have caused $1.5 billion and
the Baltic Exchange blast at St Mary
Axe $1.25 billion. The World Trade
Center bomb, as previously noted, cost only
$400 to construct but caused $550
million in both damages and lost revenue to
the business housed there.39
Moreover, unlike plastic explosives and other
military ordnance, fertiliser
and its two favourite bomb-making
components--diesel fuel and icing
sugar--are readily and easily available
commercially, completely legal to
purchase and store and thus highly attractive
"weapons components" to
terrorists and others. On the high-end of the
conflict spectrum one must
contend not only with the efforts of groups like the
Aum to develop
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities, but with
the
proliferation of fissile materials from the former-Soviet Union and
the
emergent illicit market in nuclear materials that is surfacing in Eastern
and
Central Europe.40 Admittedly, while much of the material seen on
offer as part
of this "black market" cannot be classified as SNM (strategic
nuclear
material, that is suitable in the construction a fissionable
explosive device),
such highly-toxic radioactive agents can potentially be
easily paired with
conventional explosives and turned into a crude,
non-fissionable atomic bomb
(e.g., "dirty" bomb). Such a device would
therefore not only
physically destroy a target, but contaminate the
surrounding area for decades to
come.41 Finally, at the middle-end of the
spectrum one sees a world awash in
plastic explosives, hand-held
precision-guided-munitions (i.e., surface-to-air
missiles for use against
civilian and/or military aircraft), automatic weapons,
etc. that readily
facilitate all types of terrorist operations. During the
1980s,
Czechoslovakia, for example, sold 1,000 tonnes of Semtex-H (the explosive
of
which eight ounces was sufficient to bring down Pan Am 103) to Libya
and
another 40,000 tonnes to Syria, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq--countries
long
cited by the U.S. Department of State as sponsors of international
terrorist
activity. In sum, terrorists therefore have relatively easy access
to a range of
sophisticated, "off-the-shelf" weapons technology that can be
readily
adopted to their operational needs. Concluding Observations and
Implications for
Aviation Security Terrorism today has arguably become
more complex, amorphous
transnational. The distinction between domestic and
international terrorism is
also evaporating as evidence by the Aum's sects
activities in Russia and
Australia as well as in Japan, the alleged links
between the Oklahoma City
bombers and neo-Nazis in Britain and Europe, and
the network of Algerian Islamic
extremists operating in France, Great
Britain, Sweden, Belgium and other
countries as well as in Algeria itself.
Accordingly, as these threats are both
domestic and international, the
response must therefore be both national as well
as multinational in
construct and dimensions. National cohesiveness and
organisational
preparation will necessarily remain the essential foundation for
any hope of
building the effective multinational approach appropriate to these
new
threats. Without internal (national or domestic) consistency,
clarity,
planning and organisation, it will be impossible for similarly
diffuse
multinational efforts to succeed. This is all the more critical
today, and will
remain so in the future, given the changing nature of the
terrorist threat, the
identity of its perpetrators and the resources at their
disposal. One final
point is in order given the focus of this conference on
aviation security.
Serious and considerable though the above trends are,
their implications
for--much less direct effect on--commercial aviation are
by no means clear.
Despite media impressions to the contrary and the
popular mis-perception
fostered by those impressions, terrorist attacks on
civil aviation--particularly
inflight bombings or attempted bombings--are in
fact relatively rare. Indeed,
they account for only 15 of the 2,537
international terrorist incidents recorded
between 1970 and 1979 (or .006
percent) and just 12 of 3,943 recorded between
1980 and 1989 (an even
lower .003 percent). This trend, moreover, has continued
throughout the first
half of the current decade. There have been a total of just
six inflight
bombings since 1990 out of a total of 1,859 international
terrorist
incidents. In other words, inflight bombings of commercial aviation
currently
account for an infinitesimal--.003--percent of international
terrorist
attacks.42 At the same time, the dramatic loss of life and
attendant intense
media coverage have turned those few tragic events into
terrorist
"spectaculars": etched indelibly on the psyches of commercial
air
travellers and security officers everywhere despite their
infrequent
occurrence.43 Nonetheless, those charged with ensuring the
security of airports
and aviation from terrorist threats doubtless face a
Herculean task. In the
first place, a defence that would preclude every
possible attack by every
possible terrorist group for every possible motive
is not even theoretically
conceivable. Accordingly, security measures should
accurately and closely
reflect both the threat and the difficulties inherent
in countering it: and
should therefore be based on realistic expectations
that embrace realistic
cost-benefit. Indeed, there is a point beyond which
security measures may not
only be inappropriate to the presumed threat, but
risk becoming more
bureaucratic than genuinely effective.