Somalia And US
The desire for an organization that would help the international
community"avoid future conflicts" and the recognized need for a global body
that
would "promote international economic and social cooperation" led
the
powerful states emerging from the rubble of WWII to develop the United
Nations.
The newly formed United Nations "represented an expression of
hope for the
possibilities of a new global security arrangement and for
fostering the social
and economic conditions necessary for peace to prevail"
(Mingst and Karns 2).
The need for mutual cooperation amongst the states
following the second of the
global wars was vital to the reconstruction of
war-torn Europe, and for the
development of a new world order. This attempt
at cooperation was not the first
of its kind. According to Mingst and Karns,
"The UN’s Charter built on
lessons learned from the failed League of Nations
created at the end of World
War I and earlier experiments with
international unions, conference diplomacy,
and dispute settlements
mechanisms" (2). Despite this "experience" in
mutual cooperation, the
founding states still faced many problems in the
security arena due to the
advent of the Cold War. In order to effectively deal
with security issues
facing the UN, the Security Council turned to "peace-
Mulligan 2 keeping"
as an alternative to armed aggression. According to the
United Nations
Department of Public Information, "Peacekeeping was pioneered
and developed
by the United Nations as one of the means for maintaining
international peace
and security" (1998), and the UN deals with particular
problems through "the
prevention, containment, and moderation of hostilities
between or within
states through the use of multinational forces of soldiers,
police, and
civilians" (Mingst and Karns 3). This was a very different
approach to
quelling conflicts that had never before been practiced.
Peacekeeping was
"a creative response to the breakdown of great-power unity
and the spread of
East-West tensions to regional conflicts" (Mingst and Karns
3). Before
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, John
R.
Bolton, Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute,
stated
further reasoning for the evolution of peacekeeping. He notes:
‘Traditional’
U.N. peacekeeping evolved when it became clear that the
broad intentions of the
Framers of the U.N. Charter were rendered largely
meaningless by the onset of
the Cold War. U.N. involvement in international
crises, far from being the
central dispute-resolution mechanism envisioned by
the Framers in Chapters VI
and VII, became episodic and incidental to the
main global confrontation between
East and West. Since "Cold War tensions
have subsided, peace has been
threatened by resurgent ethnic and nationalist
conflicts in Mulligan 3 many
regions. As a result, U.N. peacekeeping
operations have grown rapidly in number
and complexity in recent years. While
13 operations were established in the
first forty years of U.N. peacekeeping,
28 new operations have been launched
since 1988" (UNDPI 1998). The following
map shows the many regions of the
world in which the United Nations has
become involved in a peacekeeping mission:
Mulligan 4 Due in part because
of the extraordinarily limited dimensions within
which U.N. peacekeeping was
feasible, a clear set of principles evolved to
describe the elements
necessary for successful U.N. operations. These rules
would become the
standard from which future U.N. peace-keeping missions would be
drawn. The
first criterion for a U.N. peacekeeping mission was consent.
According to
Bolton, "All of the relevant parties to a dispute had to agree to
the
participation of U.N. peacekeepers in monitoring, observing or policing
a
truce, cease fire, or disengagement of combatants" (2000). This agreement
must
not only grant the U.N. the right to intervene in the state’s
internal
affairs, but also detail the "scope of its mission and the
operational
requirements for carrying out that mission" (Bolton 2000). A
nation-state, at
any time, could withdraw its consent at which point the U.N.
forces would
withdraw. One example of revoking consent occurred in "May,
1967, when Egypt
insisted on the withdrawal of the U.N. Expeditionary Force
(established after
the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956) from its territory along
the border with
Israel" (Bolton 2000). U.N. forces were forced to leave,
and as a result, the
Six Day War followed. Mulligan 5 A second
requirement was the notion that the
U.N. forces would not take sides in
the conflict. Bolton states that ...U.N.
peacekeepers were [to be] neutral
[amongst] the parties to the conflict, not
favoring one or another of them.
It was understood to be elemental that the
United Nations could not ‘take
sides’ in a conflict without itself becoming
involved in the very situation
it was trying to stabilize or resolve (2000).
Remaining neutral, however,
would prove to be difficult as we will witness
further along in this work. To
ensure the U.N. forces neutrality, the
peacekeepers were "almost always only
lightly armed, or unarmed, and they
frequently depended on the cooperation of
the parties to a dispute for
logistical support or cooperation" (Bolton
2000). Lacking the appropriate
offensive capabilities would deter possible
outbreaks of aggression on the part
of the peacekeeping forces. According to
Mingst and Karns, "Peacekeepers use
military force only as a last resort and
in self-defense. This precedent was a
response to the difficulties
encountered in the Congo in 1961 when the Security
Council authorized the
United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) to use force
to prevent civil
war and to remove foreign mercenaries in that country. The use
of force –
even limited force – is fraught with political and legal
controversy" (79).
As a result of the limited military Mulligan 6
capabilities, the U.N.
peacekeepers "had no right of enforcement, and their
missions were
deliberately non-coercive, not intended to compel any party to
accept a
particular settlement. U.N. rules of engagement, through
long-established
practice, provided for the use of force essentially only in
self-defense"
(Bolton 2000). The use of force by a U.N. force would be
questioned in future
peacekeeping endeavors. U.N. involvement in Somalia would
prove to be one
such example of the problems experienced by the occupying
forces. Somalia has
been described as the textbook example of a "collapsed"
or "failed" state.
Throughout the period of intervention, those involved in"restoring hope" – from
the military and civilian sides – no doubt
understood too little about the
sources of state dissolution and the respective
roles of the Somali clan
system, colonialism, and Cold War geopolitics in the
horn of Africa. Prior to
British and Italian colonialism, "there was no common
Somali identity or
centralized control over the territory of what became
Somalia. Although
more homogeneous than other countries in Africa – with a
common ethnicity,
language, culture, and religion (Islam) – Somalia’s
geographical area was
occupied by nomadic Mulligan 7 pastoral groups, organized
predominately by
paternal kinship" (Weiss 71). The continually moving
population made
establishing a centralized governmental body difficult and there
was no
recognition of a "hierarchical system". This lack of a controlling
body led
to conflict among the indigenous peoples. Thomas G. Weiss states
that
conflict was "common among lineages, especially in competition for land
and
resources necessary for survival. But there were conflict resolution
mechanisms
within the lineages, known as the ‘xeer,’ which prevented the
escalation of
conflicts by inhibiting the excessive economic stratification
in society"
(71+). He goes on to say that, "The spread of Islam modified
conflict
management by adding a mild form of the Shari’ah Islamic Law. Acts
of
vengeance were diminished through the concept of the ‘dia,’ or the
payment
of ‘blood money’ compensation to the victim by the violator" (Weiss
72).
Despite the lack of a governing body to enforce laws, social
institutions were
there to control behavior. While the basis of organization
was direct lineage,
groups were also structured by subclans and then clan
families, each
predominantly associated with sometimes overlapping
geographical areas. The six
overarching major Mulligan 8 clan families are
the Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye,
Issaq, and Rahanwein. Traditionally,
lineages continually created and shifted
alliances among other groups and
subclans. The end of colonialism in 1960
further shifted alliances amongst
the clans. The transition from a lineage/clan
based society to a centralized
state authority posed new problems for the
independent Somali government.
However, governmental attempts to rid the
political environment of
clan-influence failed when an army coup in 1969 placed
Mohammed Siad
Barre in power. Thomas G. Weiss explains the result of Barre’s
rise to power.
He says, Rhetorically, Barre’s policy of ‘scientific
socialism’ aimed to
eliminate ‘clanism,’ but the end result of his
twenty-two-year rule was
strengthening of clan-based politics. He forbade the
use of clan names;
however, his primary method of obtaining and maintaining
power was to draw
support from his own clan and those linked by lineage and to
pit other clans
against one another. Virginia Lung has described this policy as
a form of
‘clan clientelism,’ in which arms, money, and land were
distributed to clans
in order to maintain his power (73). Thus, the clan-based
system was not
eliminated; it was reinforced. The late 1980’s saw the steady
decline in
Barre’s power. "The combination of food crises, economic
collapse, and the
end of Cold War competition in the horn, along with the
resulting decline in
foreign aid, began to erode Barre’s base" (Weiss 75).
Further, the rise
of clan-based national movements and their success in
challenging Barre’s
Mulligan 9 rule led to the multiplication of clan based
factions. "Spurred by
the fear that one group’s assumption of power would be
detrimental to
another’s own position," says Weiss, "clan-based opposition
led to extreme
fragmentation of Somali society" (75). In the end, Barre’s
own policy
backfired on him. By 1990, his power base was limited to only one
clan – the
Marehan. In 1991 and 1992 "civil order in Somalia totally
collapsed as
warring clans seized control of parts of the country" (Mingst and
Karns
92). The fighting that followed, with clans and subclans constituted in
loose
alliances without central control, took place at a time of serious
drought.
That combination proved disastrous for the population at large. By
1992,
"almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number in the
country,
were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related
diseases"
(UNDPI 1997). According to Mingst and Karns, "Widespread famine
and chaos
accompanied the fighting, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians
to the
brink of starvation. Control of food was a vital political resource for
the
Somali warlords and a currency to pay the mercenary gangs who formed
their
militias" (92). At this time, "most government, NGO, and U.N.
humanitarian
Mulligan 10 organizations evacuated staff and suspended
programs" (Weiss 78).
A handful of organizations, however, remained and
attempted to counteract
overwhelming human suffering. In mid-1992, "in
response to the increased media
coverage, the number Of NGOs dramatically
increased temporarily, eventually
numbering around fifty" (Weiss 79).
However, as Lt. General Manfred Eisele
illustrates in his report to the
United Nations following the Somalia crisis it
was hard to make progress
without military intervention. He says: The descent
into anarchy, with the
concomitant lack of security, was the main reason why a
large-scale and
well-coordinated relief operation could not be mounted in
Somalia in
1992. Although notable results were achieved on the humanitarian
relief
front, including the advocacy work of NGOs, the mass feeding
kitchens
operated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
opening of
Mogadishu port the World Food Programme, far too little was
achieved too late
and the lives of countless Somalis, mainly women and young
children, were lost.
Thus, adequate security arrangements [were]
imperative to safeguard the
humanitarian space needed for successful relief
operations. At this point,
"international pressure [was] building for the
secretary-general and the
Security Council to intervene in Somalia in an
effort to end months of factional
fighting" (San Diego Union-Tribune 1992).
However, some members appeared
reluctant to become deeply involved in what
they saw as an increasingly
dangerous and chaotic situation. Further, there
was also "widespread
reluctance among Security Council members to suggest any
peacekeeping role for
the United Nations when the Somali factions were
Mulligan 11 still fighting one
another and bands of armed irregulars roam the
country" (San Diego
Union-Tribune 1992). However, in April 1992, the U.N.
decided to intervene.
Established to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu,
the capital of Somalia, and
to provide protection and security for United
Nations personnel, equipment and
supplies at the seaports and airports in
Mogadishu and escort deliveries of
humanitarian supplies from there to
distribution centers in the city and its
immediate environs, the United
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) began. 500
Pakistani troops were
deployed in August 1992. However, by November 1992,
"1,000 Somalis [were]
dying every day and three-fourths of Somalia’s
children under age five [were]
already dead" (Mingst and Karns 92). The
secretary-general of the U.N. felt
that "more forceful measures" were
needed. In December 1992, the U.N.
authorized "a large U.S.-led
military-humanitarian intervention – Unified
Task Force (UNITAF) – to secure
ports and airfields, protect relief shipments
and workers, and assist
humanitarian relief efforts" (Mingst and Karns 92+).
Also on UNITAF’s agenda
were the imposition of a ceasefire, and the
disarmament of the various factions.
In 1993, however, UNITAF was
Mulligan 12 replaced by UNISOM II after few results
in peacekeeping were
achieved. UNISOM II differed from previous attempts at
intervention in that
it was authorized to use force when disarming the factions.
Similarly,
the faction leaders were now targets for elimination by the
intervention
forces. This converted the U.N.’s role from neutral peacekeeper
to active
belligerent, putting UNISOM "in the worst of all possible worlds
which past
peacekeepers had scrupulously avoided...[and] made it one of the
players in
the conflict" (Mingst and Karns 93). As the U.S. military pursued a
more
active role in thwarting the factions, they experienced casualties.
On
October 3, 1994, 18 soldiers were killed and 78 wounded during a
rescue attempt.
The American public was outraged by the massacre, and did
not legitimize the
sacrifice made by the American soldiers nor the current
role of its military
abroad. U.S. troops were withdrawn from Somalia in March
1995. When the last of
the U.N. troops were withdrawn, the ultimate result of
the military help and
humanitarian delivery was unclear. It was a
"non-event," wrote Gerard
Prunier, and "life went on pretty much the same
way as it had gone on during
the late UNISOM II period" (Weiss 95). Three
years and some $4 billion had
Mulligan 13 left the warring parties better
armed, rested, and posed to resume
civil war. The Somalia crisis can be
analyzed by examining the relationship
between the IO, namely the U.N., and
the nation-state, Somalia. As we have seen,
IO’s do not prevent wars from
happening. They can not prevent them because
they do not have the power to do
so. Only the nation-state can prevent the war.
In order to understand
this better, we must look at this through the Westphalian
System v.
Grotian Law perspective. The Westphalian system, based on the Treaty
of
Westphalia of 1648, is one that contends that the nation-state has the
right
to territorial self-determination. Essentially, the people within
their
territory decide want they want, and no other nation can intervene in
their
internal affairs. The Somali warlords believed that they had the right
to
determine what was best for them within their country’s boundaries. Thus,
they
rejected the U.N. presence in their homeland. Grotian Law, however,
contends
that nation-states must work together in order to achieve common
interests, and
that cooperation is paramount. The U.N. adopted this role when
it felt it needed
to intercede on Somalia’s behalf in order to alleviate
global concerns for the
suffering people in Mulligan 14 Somalia. This is when
the two schools of thought
are unable to reach decisions, and problems arise.
The IO does not have the
authority to force the nation-state to comply with
global concerns. As we have
seen in Somalia, the U.N. forces were unable to
make great progress in
establishing peace. Another pattern observed in the
Somalia issue is Rhetoric v.
Actual Behavior. Many times, a nation-state
will sign treaties and then perform
actions completely opposite of this. In
this case, the Somali warlords signed
countless ceasefires with envoys to
allow humanitarian relief efforts to gain
access to the needy people.
However, the fighting never seemed to end despite
the promised calm. Somalia
and U.N. Peacekeeping Forces: Who Has the Right?
Seann T. Mulligan April
25, 2000 Professor Sterling-Folker POLS 225 Works
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Resistance: The
Culture and History of a South African People. Chicago: 1989.
Creveld, M.
van. On Future War. London: Brassey's, 1991. Davis, J. The
Anthropology
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and S. P.
Reyna, (eds.). University Press of New England. Land and Society
in
Contemporary Africa. Hanover, New Hampshire: 1988. Eriksen, T. H.
Ethnicity and
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R. B and N. L. Whitehead (eds.). Santa Fe: School
of American Research Press.
War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and
Indigenous Warfare. 1992. Goheen,
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Middle
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York: Center of Concern. The Bones of Our Children Are Not
Yet Buried: The
Looming Spectre of Famine and Massive Richards, P. Famine
(and war) in Africa.
Anthropology Today 8 (6). Works Cited Bolton, John
R., Congressional Testimony,
April 4, 2000. Eisele, Lt. Gen. Manfred.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
http://www.un.org Mingst, Karen A. and
Margaret P. Karns. The United Nation in
the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed.
Westview Press, 2000. San Diego Union-Tribune,
The. "Somalia civil war
will test the mettle of new boss at U.N." December
12, 1992. UN
Department of Public Information. "UN Peacekeeping: Some
Questions and
Answers", September 1996. UN Department of Public Information.
"Somalia –
UNISOM I", March 1997. UN Department of Public Information.
"Somalia –
UNISOM II", August 1996. Weiss, Thomas G., Military-Civilian
Actions.
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. UN Peacekeeping in Somalia Widespread
drought
in Somalia brought relief efforts into the country. Starvation and
disease
are rampant. The collapse of the political framework led to civil war
amongst
the various factions. The relief efforts were being targeted by
the
Somali warlords and the Somali president petitions the U.N. for help.
U.N.
peacekeeping forces are sent in to protect humanitarian relief workers
and to
ensure that the food stuffs are being delivered. Three Phases: I.
UNISOM I
(United Nations Operations in Somalia) -- comprised mainly of 500
Pakistani
soldiers, lightly armed II. UNITAF (United Task Force) -- after
little is gained
by UNISOM I, the U.N. secretary-general calls for more
coercive action. -- a
large U.S.-led military-humanitarian intervention,
known as "Operation Restore
Hope" -- UNITAF was largely successful in
achieving its humanitarian
objectives, supplying food to those who need it
and imposing de facto ceasefire
in areas of deployment -- could not, however,
fulfill the larger tasks of
peacemaking. The US withdraws from Somalia and
was replaced by UNISOM II III.
UNISOM II -- a larger and more heavily
armed force than a traditional
peacekeeping contingent but smaller than
UNITAF and lacking much of the heavy
equipment and airpower brought by the
US. Result: UN forces have succeeded in
relieving much of the starvation but
not in helping the Somalis to reestablish a
national government or to end
their internal strife. Relevant Approaches for
Analysis: 1. Westphalian
System v. Grotian Law 2. Rhetoric v. Actual Behavior