Multilaterianism
When President Bill Clinton was inaugurated in 1993, he stressed a new
policy
concerning a revived United Nations and the actions that would be
taken by the
United States concerning the "New World Order," a term
coined by his
predecessor George Bush depicting the post-Cold War
international arena. Clinton
had campaigned on the need for a multilateral
organization to share costs and
share risks of any peacekeeping venture. The
Clinton Administration had made
multilateralism a campaign issue and put it
in the forefront of their foreign
policy agenda. However, with the problems
occurred during the initial trial
period of this assertive multilateralism,
exemplified by US military blunders in
Somalia, Clinton and his advisors
now found themselves questioning their own
policies and preferences in
foreign affairs especially in terms of multilateral
peace operations. This
case study delves into these issues and how Clinton and
his administration
sought answers to this problematic puzzle. The main
operations of the United
Nations are humanitarian relief efforts, peacekeeping
by invitation and peace
enforcement. The latter entails the most danger and
conflict situations.
These are soldiers trained to fight, not make peace. This
is, and always will
be, an enigma for those associated with peacekeeping
operations. The same
forces that are meant to keep the peace for a UN
peacekeeping mission have
been trained all their lives to make war, not peace.
Your warmakers are
your peacemakers. This will always cause confusion and
disruption in any
relief efforts involving peacekeeping operations. The case
study attempts to
explain the problems encountered during multilateral peace
operations.
Certain issues must first be addressed. The national interest of
the
United States is first and foremost. This is the key to making peace
or to
making war. The issue of whom is in command and who is in control is
also an
important factor as is the time frame in which the US will remain
involved.
Certain issues that became hot topics of debate among Clinton’s
advisors were
those of the Rapid Reaction Force and the idea of private UN
forces. The latter
fell into ill favor with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Colin Powell, who did
not like the circumstances of a separate US military
entity solely used as a
mechanism of the UN. The benefits of a Rapid Reaction
Force were many. They
could be deployed quickly. They would also alternate
countries. A database would
be created; therefore the US would not always
have to go on the respective
missions called on by the UN. The case study
completes while examining the
choices Clinton finally made regarding
multilateral peace operations. He used
the advice of his two closest cabinet
members to this issue in an attempt to
reach a resolution: Powell and
Secretary of State Madeline Albright. Albright
wanted to practice assertive
multilateralism and use the UN forces only when it
benefited the US. She said
that the US should always try a multilateralist
approach to the respective
situation, and if there is no sharing and they
receive no international
support but the issue at stake is in it vital national
interest, the US will
go on alone. Powell was against the practice as a whole.
He did not look
too kindly on the idea of the US engaging in an unknown war, at
an unknown
time and under an unknown command. Powell also hesitated to support
a
military venture with unknown goals, unknown missions and an unknown in
the
controlling offices. The finality of the situation was that the
Clinton
Administration was way too optimistic on the idea of world peace.
They were not
realistic. Multilateralism can work, but it mustn’t be the
centerpiece of a
foreign policy agenda as Clinton had sought it to be. The
reasons why Clinton
eventually took this approach were three-fold. The
military, exemplified by
Powell’s emphatic stance, were against the
entire idea. Congress, after
Somalia, was weary of further intervention,
as was the public. This case study
details the problems that can occur within
an administration when ideological
differences abound, particularly between
military and political players.