Haiti`s Politics
The flood of refugees and disorder of democracy in the island nation of
Haiti
created the great controversy of whether the United States (US) should
intervene
and restore order in the country. The US turned to its worldview
of
disengagement to provide guidance; the conclusion questioned if even a
drop of
American blood should be spilled to aid Haiti. The experience in
Vietnam
modified attitudes so that the US wouldn’t be so quick to intervene
militarily
in foreign conflicts. In accordance with its worldviews, the US
shouldn’t have
intervened in Haiti since the situation not only lacked a
clear threat to the
US, but also the substantial benefit and strong
public support—reasons deeming
intervention necessary and proper at the time.
The wave of refugees was hardly a
threat to the US; yet reasons, at the time,
for intervening was more of a
political than military necessity and Haiti was
in a state of domestic turmoil.
The US has undergone three worldviews
since the 1920s—each offering valuable
lessons and shaping the foreign policy
of the era. Munich-Pearl Harbor, also
known as antiappeasement, was a
dramatic shift from isolationism, which
developed after World War I. When
adhering to the isolationism, the US
eventually found itself amidst a
terrible, but preventable, war. When the
British and French attempted
unsuccessfully to satisfy Hitler’s territorial
demands at the conference in
Munich, the world learned that appeasement will not
prevent war; thus Munich
became associated with weakness. Japan drew the US into
the war through the
attack on Pearl Harbor, ending the isolationist attitude.
Both Europe and
the US learned that they must contain the spread of communism,
even if it may
seem insignificant, to possibly to prevent the ensuing war.
However, the
antiappeasement policy led the US to enter the Vietnam conflict,
revealing
the weaknesses of the Munich-Pearl Harbor worldview—the US would be
led into
costly conflicts with little probability that it could win. The
disaster in
Vietnam led to the creation of the disengagement view, which was
a
combination of the Munich-Pearl Harbor and isolationism paradigms. This
view
suggests that the US fight only particular battles with high chances of
success.
Also, Vietnam portrayed that winning a war is doubtful if it
doesn’t have the
support of the people and there shouldn’t be any
interventions in civil
conflicts. The call for military action is justified
if a clear and immediate
danger is evident; however, the situation in Haiti
lacked such a danger to the
US. The only clear effect Haiti had on the US
were the refugees attempting to
reach American soil, which aroused the public
enough to call for a stop to the
influx of refugees. However, this request
doesn’t necessarily constitute major
public support for military intervention
in Haiti. Refugees are not considered a
clear and immediate threat; therefore
the use of the military is questionable.
The US also learned from Vietnam
that involvement in a conflict that the public
does not condone hinders the
chances of success. There wasn’t strong public
support for intervention in
Haiti, as there was to enter World War II, thus it
may become a regretful
decision militarily as well as politically. Without a
clear threat or
overwhelming public support, the US lacked a definite reason to
take action
in Haiti. One lesson the US learned from Vietnam is that it
shouldn’t become
involved in the civil disputes of other countries. The
situation in Haiti was
very much a civil situation. If the current worldview
were followed, the US
would have not gotten involved. The people of Haiti were
divided between the
supporters of democracy and those fearing the return of the
democratic
president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Therefore, attaining a clear
mandate to
assist the people of Haiti would be difficult. Vietnam exemplified
that we
shouldn’t become militarily involved in foreign matter that do not
have the
support of that country’s majority. Also, whether Haiti wants US help
is
unknown. When the US strived to restore stability in Haiti in 1915,
the
Haitians became upset and didn’t want US aid, proving that the exact
situation
could occur now. The fact that Haiti was in a civil dispute weighs
against
support for intervening in the country. The actual reasons to finally
take
action with Haiti were not out of necessity, but rather out of
political
reasons. When action is taken from this direction, it will lack the
widespread
support found if action is taken out of necessity. The argument
the US was
intervening in Haiti to restore democracy was not the actual
reason action was
taken. Action was finally taken in order to appease
particular interest groups,
such as the black congressional caucus, to pass
President Clinton’s healthcare
bills. The restoration of democracy was also
unlikely because it never had a
foothold in Haiti, where dictatorship and
political turmoil long existed in its
history, even before a democracy was
established. Therefore, the restoration of
democracy may be a temporary
episode that may be soon upturned by another coup
d'?tat. The non-political
benefits in invading Haiti were weak and the
political reasons cannot justify
the loss of American lives. The US’ actions
regarding Haiti appear to
contradict the disengagement worldview because there
wasn’t sufficient reason
to take action. An immediate threat didn’t exist,
nor was there clear support
for action, and the results were questionable. Once
the US took action, it
didn’t secure democracy and soon Haiti was removed from
the political agenda.
Hence, it can be inferred that the US never took a
long-term interest in
Haiti and the sole purpose of the military action was to
appease the interest
groups. Such action should only occur if there is a
compelling reason (which
was lacking during the US involvement), or if there is
now a departure from
the disengagement worldview into a new paradigm.