Clash Of Civilizations
The Clash of Civilizations suggests that world politics is entering a new
phase.
It is his hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in
the New World
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.
Huntington believes
that the great divisions amongst humankind and the
dominating source of conflict
will be in the cultural form. Nation states
will still remain the most powerful
actors in world affairs, but the
principal conflicts of global politics will
occur between nations and groups
of different civilizations. Huntington states:
"The clash of civilizations
will dominate global politics. The fault lines
between civilizations will be
the battle lines of the future". Huntington
suggests that the old groupings
of the Cold War are no longer relevant (First,
Second and Third Worlds).
He proposes a new grouping of countries, not in terms
of their political or
economic systems or in terms of their level of economic
development but
rather in terms of their culture and civilization. Huntington
defines
civilizations as a "cultural entity". Villages, regions,
ethnic groups,
nationalities, and religious groups, all with distinct cultures
at different
levels of cultural diversity. A civilization is thus the highest
cultural
grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people
have
short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is
identified
both by "common objective elements, such as language, history,
religion,
customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of
people".
However of all the objective elements which define civilizations,
the most
important he states is religion. The major civilizations in human
history
have been closely identified with the world's greatest religions, and
people
who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter
each
other, as happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and the
Subcontinent.
The Clash of Rights categorizes the major contemporary
civilizations as follows:
Sinic, a distinct Chinese civilization;
Japanese, a distinct civilization which
was the offspring of Chinese
civilization; Hindu, the core of Indian
civilization; Islamic, many distinct
cultures existing within including Arab,
Turkic, Persian, and Malay;
Orthodox, centered in Russia and separate from
Western Christendom;
Western, associated with Christianity, Renaissance,
Reformation and
Enlightenment; Latin America, a separate civilization closely
affiliated with
the West but divided as to where it belongs in the West; and
possibly
African; as the North and East coast are associated with Islam but
the
remainder have developed a sense of distinct identity. See figure 1.1
included
within. Huntington also states civilization's identity will be
increasingly
important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large
measure by the
interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. In the
New World the most
prevalent, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be
between social
classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups,
but between
peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and
ethnic
conflicts will occur within civilizations. An example of this
behaviour can be
seen in various recent occurrences. In the Yugoslav
conflicts, Russia provided
diplomatic support to the Serbs, and Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Iran and Libya
provided funds and arms to the Bosnians, not for
reasons of ideology or power
politics or economic interest but because of
cultural kinship. In sum, the key
issues on the international agenda involve
differences among civilizations.
Power is shifting from the long
predominant West to non-Western civilizations.
Global politics has become
multipolar and multicivilizational and as the West
attempts to assert its
values and to protect its interests, non-Western
societies confront a choice.
Huntington states: "Some attempt to emulate
the West and join with the West;
while other Confucian and Islamic societies
attempt to expand their own
economic and military power to resist and to balance
against the West. The
central axis of post-Cold War world politics is thus the
interaction of
Western power and culture with the power and culture of
non-Western
civilizations". At the end of the Cold War several
"maps" were introduced as
to how nation-states of the world would
exist. The first is of One World.
This paradigm was based on the assumption that
the end of the Cold War meant
the end of significant conflict in global politics
and the emergence of one
harmonious world. The one harmonious world paradigm is
clearly far from
reality to be a useful guide to the post-Cold War world. The
second is of Two
Worlds. The "us and them", but more commonly the rich
(modern developed), and
the poor (traditional, underdeveloped or developing)
countries. However the
world is too complex to be envisioned as simply divided
economically between
North and South or culturally between east and West;
perhaps the West and the
Rest. The third paradigm is 184 States, More or Less.
It derives from the
Realist concept of international relations and suggests that
states are the
only important actors in world affairs and the relation among
states is one
of anarchy, and hence to insure their survival and security,
states
invariably attempt to maximize their power. This paradigm is more
accurate,
however it assumes that all states perceive their interests in the
same way
and act in the same way. States define their interests in terms of
power but
also in terms of values, culture, and institutions presently influence
how
states define their interests. And finally the last paradigm is Sheer
Chaos.
It stresses: the breakdown of governmental authority, the breakup
of states, the
intensification of tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict, the
emergence of
international criminal mafias, refugees multiplying into the
tens of millions,
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction, the
spread of terrorism, the prevalence of massacres and
ethnic cleansing. The world
may be chaos but it is not totally without order.
An image of universal and
uniform anarchy provides few clues for
understanding the world. Next, the book
looks at V.S. Naipaul's theory of a
"universal civilization" which can
be defined as the general cultural coming
together of humanity and the
increasing acceptance of common values, beliefs,
orientations, practices, and
institutions by peoples around the world.
Naipaul's theory lies behind three
general principles: first, most peoples in
most societies have a similar
"moral sense"; second, civilized societies have
cities and literacy in
common which distinguish them from primitive societies
and barbarians; and
third, people generally share beliefs in individualism,
market economies, and
political democracy, also know as the "Davos Culture
effect". However,
Huntington and Ronald Dore put forth a case of their
own suggesting that there
are two things, which are not constant throughout
the world, but are imperative
in global communication and cooperation. These
aspects are language and religion
as both are central elements of any culture
or civilization. The world's
language is known to be English but Huntington
argues this assertion and states:
The overall pattern of language use in
the world did not change dramatically.
Significant declines occurred in
the proportion of people speaking English,
French, German, Russian, and
Japanese, that a smaller decline occurred in the
proportion of people
speaking Mandarin, and that increases occurred in the
proportion of people
speaking Hindi, Malay-Indonesian, Arabic, Bengali, Spanish,
Portuguese,
and other languages. He believes that as the power of the West
gradually
declines relative to that of other civilizations, the use of English
and
other Western languages in other societies and for communications
between
societies will slowly erode. Language is realigned and reconstructed
to accord
with the identities and contours of civilizations. A universal
religion is also
very unlikely to emerge. A religious resurgence has occurred
and it has involved
the intensification of religious consciousness and the
rise of fundamentalist
movements. The data of table 3.3 on page 65
demonstrates increases in the
proportions of the world's population adhering
to the two major religions, Islam
and Christianity. In the long run, however,
Islam wins out as Christianity
spreads primarily by conversion whereas Islam
spreads by conversion and
reproduction. In the modern world religion is a
central, perhaps the central,
force that motivates and mobilizes people. The
most fundamental divisions of
humanity are in terms of ethnicity, religion,
and civilizations, which remain
and spawn new conflicts. The book proceeds to
discuss why civilizations will
clash and in which manner. Huntington
discusses six reasons for these conflicts
and explains each accordingly.
First, the book explains, differences among
civilizations are not only real;
they are basic. History, language, culture,
tradition, and most important
religion differentiate civilizations from each
other. These differences are
far more fundamental than differences among
political ideologies and
political regimes. They do not necessarily mean
conflict, however over the
centuries; differences among civilizations have
generated the most prolonged
and most violent conflicts. Second, the world is
becoming a smaller place.
The interactions between the peoples of different
civilizations are
increasing; these increasing interactions intensify
civilization
consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations
and
commonalties within civilizations. An example of this is seen with
North
African immigrants in France who generate hostility as opposed to
Catholic Poles
who are seen as "good" immigrants. Third, the processes of
economic
modernization and social change throughout the world are separating
people from
longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state
as a source of
identity. In much of the world religion has moved to fill this
gap, often in the
form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist". The
revival of
religion, "La Revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it,
provides
a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national
boundaries and
unites civilizations. Fourth, the growth of
civilization-consciousness is
enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the
one hand, the West is at a peak of
power. At the same time, however, and
perhaps as a result, a return to the roots
phenomenon is occurring among
non-Western civilizations. Huntington presumes a
West at the peak of its
power confronting non-Wests that increasingly have the
desire, the will and
the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.
Fifth, cultural
characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less
easily
compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. The key
question
used to be "Which side are you on?" Today it is "Who are
you?" A person can
be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a
citizen of two
countries. However it is much more difficult to be half-Catholic
and
half-Muslim. Finally, he proposes, economic regionalism is increasing.
The
proportions to total that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989
from
fifty one percent to fifty nine percent in Europe, thirty three percent
to
thirty seven percent in East Asia, and thirty two percent to thirty six
percent
in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely
to
continue to increase in the future. However, Japan faces difficulties
in
creating an economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and
a
civilization, which is unique to itself. However strong the trade and
investment
links Japan may develop with other east Asian countries, its
cultural
differences with those countries inhabit and perhaps preclude its
promoting
regional economic integration like that of Europe and North
America. If cultural
commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration,
the principle East Asian
economic bloc of the future is likely to centered on
China. As Murray Weidenbaum
had observed: "Despite the current Japanese
dominance of the region, the
Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly
emerging as a new epicenter for
industry, commerce and finance". As people
define their identity in ethnic
and religious terms, they are seen as "us"
versus "them"
relation existing between themselves and people of different
ethnicity or
religion. Differences in culture and religion create differences
over policy
issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and
commerce to the
environment. The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two
levels. At the
micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between
civilizations
struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and
each other. At the
macro-level, states from different civilizations compete
for relative military
and economic power, struggle over the control of
international institutions and
third parties, and competitively promote their
particular political and
religious values. Huntington also discusses the
effects of modernization and
Westernization. First, he looks at trade and
the likelihood of conflict amongst
countries trading with each other. He
rejects the assumption that it reduces the
probability of war between
nations, and asserts that evidence actually proves
the contrary. He
understands the significant expansion of international trade
during the 1960s
and 1970s, but stresses that this correlation is meaningless as
the world
witnessed record highs in international trade in 1913 only to be
followed by
a global slaughter in unprecedented numbers few years later in World
War
I. Economic interdependence fosters peace only "when states expect that
high
trade levels will continue into the foreseeable future." If states do
not
expect high levels of interdependence to continue, war is likely to
result.
Following Huntington identifies Western civilization and
concludes that it does
not represent modern civilization since the West was
the West long before it was
actually modern. Western culture is classified
with seven characteristics: a
classical legacy, Catholicism and
Protestantism, European languages, separation
of spiritual and temporary
authority, rule of law, social pluralism,
representative bodies, and
individualism. Individually, almost none of these
factors were unique to the
West, however the combination of them was unique.
Huntington also tries
to establish the response nations will have to the West
and to modernization.
He claims the expansion of the West has promoted both the
modernization and
the Westernization of non-Western societies. The political and
intellectual
leaders of these societies have responded to the Western impact in
one or
more of three ways: rejecting both modernization and
Westernization,
embracing both, or embracing modernization and rejecting
Westernization. In the
twentieth century improvements in transportation and
communication and global
interdependence increased tremendously the costs of
exclusion. Except for small,
isolated, rural, communities willing to exist at
a subsistence level, the total
rejection of modernization as well as
Westernization is hardly possible in a
world becoming overwhelmingly modern
and highly interconnected. Kemalism, which
is the embrace of both concepts,
is based on the assumptions that modernization
is desirable and necessary,
that the indigenous culture is incompatible with
modernization and must be
abandoned or abolished. Society must fully westernize
in order to
successfully modernization and both reinforce each other and have to
go
together. Finally, the Reformist approach attempts to combine
modernization
with the preservation of the central values, practices, and
institutions of the
society's indigenous culture. This choice has
understandably been the most
popular one among non-Western elites. As the
ideological division of Europe has
disappeared, the cultural division of
Europe between Western Christianity, on
the one hand, and Orthodox
Christianity and Islam, on the other, has emerged. As
the diagram 1.2
illustrates, the Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron
Curtain
of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the
events in
Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at
times a
line of bloody conflict. The Clash of Rights reviews that this
century-old
military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to
decline. In
fact it could become more violent. The Gulf War left some Arabs
feeling proud
that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West.
It also
left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military
presence in
the Persian Gulf. Those relations, Huntington states, are also
complicated by
demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab countries,
particularly
in North Africa, has led to increase migration to Western Europe.
The
movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries
has
sharpened political sensitivities with respect to this development. On
both
sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash
of
civilizations. M.J. Akbar, a Muslim author states "The next
confrontation
is definitely going to come from the Muslim world". The
modernization of
Africa and the spread of Christianity, he concludes, are
likely to enhance the
probability of violence along this fault line. Examples
of this violence are
evident in current world affairs such as: the on-going
civil war in the Sudan
between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between
Libyan-supported
insurgents and the government, the tensions between Orthodox
Christians and
Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political
conflicts, recurring riots and
communal violence between Muslim and
Christians in Nigeria. On the northern
border of Islam, conflict has
increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim
peoples; including the
carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, and the violence between
Serbs and
Albanians. The historic clash between Muslims and Hindus manifests
itself now
not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in
intensifying
religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu
groups and
India's substantial Muslim minority. Furthermore, with the Cold War
over, the
underlying differences between China and the United States have
reasserted
themselves in areas such as human rights, trade, and weapons
proliferation.
The differences are unlikely to be moderated. And finally,
violence also
occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in
the
Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and
Catholics in
the Philippines. In every respect, Huntington believes, the
Islamic bloc from
the bulge of Africa to central Asia has bloody borders. Two
pictures exist of
the power of the West in relation to other civilizations.
The first is of
overwhelming, triumphant, almost total Western dominance. The
disintegration of
the Soviet Union removed the only serious challenger to the
West and as a result
the world is and will be shaped by the goals,
priorities, and interests of the
principal Western nations, with perhaps an
occasional assist from Japan. The
second picture of the West is very
different. It is of a civilization in
decline, its share of world political,
economic, and military power going down
relative to that of other
civilizations. Further, this view proposes that the
West is now
confronted with slow economic growth, stagnating populations,
unemployment,
huge government deficits, a declining work ethic, low savings
rates, social
disintegration, drugs, and crime. In the Clash of Rights,
Huntington
defends the second theory as the one, which best describes reality.
He
believes the West's power is declining and will continue to do so as the
most
significant increases in power are occurring and will occur in
Asian
civilizations, particularly in China. However this decline, he
describes, is not
so simple. It will occur within three major
characteristics. First it is a slow
process; second this decline is highly
irregular with pauses, reversals, and
some renewals; and thirdly the West's
power to influence the World is based on
numerous factors such as economic,
military, institutional, demographic,
political, technological, and social
powers; all which are declining. In sum,
Huntington concludes the West's
power is a decline in three core elements.
Territory and population are
first. Westerners constitute a steadily decreasing
minority of the world's
population. Furthermore, the balance between the West
and other populations
is also changing. Non-Western peoples are becoming
healthier, more urban,
more literate, and better educated. Next is economic
product, which is been
declining since the Second World War for Westerners. This
relative decline
is; of course, in large part a function of the rapid rise of
East Asia.
And lastly, military capability which as Huntington demonstrates on
table
4.6, page 88; that the West's military manpower, spending, forces,
and
capabilities are at a significant decline whereas it is in a large rise
in
non-Western nations. Huntington states: We are witnessing the end of
the
progressive era dominated by Western ideologies and are moving into an
era in
which multiple and diverse civilizations will interact, compete,
coexist, and
accommodate each other. This is the revival of religion
occurring in so many
parts of the world and most notably in the cultural
resurgence in Asian and
Islamic countries generated in large part by
their economic and demographic
dynamism. The Clash of Civilizations asserts
that the West is in a unique
situation. Countries that for the reason of
culture and power do not wish, or
cannot, join the West instantly compete
with the West by developing their own
economic, military, and political
power. They do this by promoting their
internal development and by
cooperating with other non-Western countries. The
most prominent for of this
cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that
has emerged to challenge
Western interests, values and power. Asian
assertiveness is rooted in
economic growth; Muslim assertiveness stems in
considerable measure from
social mobilization and population growth. The
economic development in China
and other Asian societies provides their
governments with both the incentives
and the resources to become more demanding
in their dealing with other
countries. Population growth in Muslim countries
provides recruits for
fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency, and migration.
Economic growth
strengthens Asian governments; demographic growth threatens
Muslim
governments and non-Muslim societies. In general, states belonging to
one
civilization that become involved in war with people from a
different
civilization naturally try to rally support from other member of
their own
civilization. S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome,
is
replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power
considerations as
the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. This
was witnessed during
the Gulf war, as Safar Al-Hawali describes "The West
against Islam". A
world of clashing civilizations, states Huntington, is
however, inevitably a
world of double standards: people apply one standard to
their kin-countries and
a different standard to others. With respects to the
fighting in the former
Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy
and support for the Bosnian
Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the
hands of the Serbs. Relatively
little concern was expressed, however, over
Croatian attacks on Muslims and
participation in the dismemberment of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Islamic government
groups, on the other hand, castigated
the West for not coming to the defense of
the Bosnians as over two dozen
Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in
Bosnia. Huntington
acknowledges that conflicts and violence will also occur
between states and
groups within the same civilizations. Such conflicts,
however, are likely to
be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts
between
civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces the
probability of
violence in situations where it might otherwise occur. As the
conflicts in
the Persian Gulf, and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations
and the
cleavages between them increasingly were long civilizational lines. The
next
World War, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations,
Huntington
concludes. Spurred by modernization, global politics is being
reconfigured along
cultural lines. Peoples and countries with similar
cultures are coming together.
Peoples and countries with different
cultures are coming apart. Alignments
defined by ideology and superpower
relations are giving way to alignments
defined by culture and civilization.
Political boundaries increasingly are
redrawn to coincide with cultural ones:
ethnic, religious, and civilizational.
Cultural communities are replacing
Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between
civilizations are becoming the
central lines of conflict in global politics.
This, Huntington asserts,
is the cultural reconfiguration of global politics.
Further, he believes
these cultural differences do not facilitate cooperation
and cohesion but on
the contrary, they promote cleavages and conflicts for a
number of reasons.
First, everyone has multiple identities, which may compete
with or reinforce
each other. Second, the alienation of cultural identity
creates the need for
more meaningful identities as the power of non-Western
societies stimulate
the revitalization of indigenous identities and culture.
Third, identity
at any level-personal, tribal, racial, or civilization can only
be defined in
relation to an "other" as opposed to the "like
us". Fourth, the sources of
conflict between states and groups from
different civilizations are, in large
measure, those, which have always
generated conflict between groups. Fifth
and finally is the prevalence of
conflict. It is human to hate. Just as most
nations are aligned with a
particular civilization or grouping there are
others which have difficulties
aligning and finding commonalties amongst
civilizations. These nations
Huntington categorizes as "torn countries".
The reason for this
syndrome is that these nations usually have one or more
places viewed by their
members as the principal source or sources of their
civilization. These sources
are often located within the Core State or states
of the civilization, that is,
its most powerful and culturally central state
or states. Islam, Latin America
and Africa all lack core states. This lack of
a core state endangers the
potential for these cultures to take a leadership
role in global politics.
Globally the most important torn country is
Russia. The question of whether
Russia is a part of the West or the
leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox
civilization has been a recurring one in
Russian history. In order to redefine
its civilization identity, a torn
country must meet three requirements. First,
its political and economic elite
has to be generally supportive of and
enthusiastic about this move. Second,
its public has to be willing to acquiesce
in the redefinition. Third, the
dominant groups in the recipient civilization
have to be willing to embrace
the convert. A similar example of these criteria
has been Mexico. Another
syndrome discussed by Huntington is of a "lone
country". These countries lack
cultural commonality with other societies.
Ethiopia, Haiti, and more
importantly Japan, are lone countries. Finally, the
last syndrome mentioned
is "cleft countries". This occurs when large
groups belong to different
civilizations causing the populace to become deeply
divided. Examples of
current cleft countries are Sudan, Nigeria, Tanzania, and
Kenya. Some
possible cleft countries, Huntington presumes, are India, Sri
Lanka,
Malaysia, Singapore, China, Philippines, Indonesia, and maybe even
Canada.
Basically, having achieved political independence, non-Western
societies wish to
free themselves from Western economic, military, and
cultural domination. East
Asian societies are well on their way to
equaling the West economically. A
general anti-Western coalition, however,
seems unlikely in the immediate future.
Islamic and Sinic civilizations
differ fundamentally in terms of religion,
culture, social structure,
traditions, politics, and basic assumptions at the
root of their way of life.
Inherently each probably has less in common with the
other than it has in
common with Western civilization. Yet in politics a common
enemy creates a
common interest. Islamic, and Sinic societies which see the West
as their
antagonist thus have reason to cooperate with each other against
the
West. Huntington states: "Trust and friendship will be rare".
The
overriding lesson of the history of civilizations, however, is that many
things
are probable but nothing is inevitable. Civilizations can and have
reformed and
renewed themselves. The central issue for the West is whether,
quite apart from
any external challenges, it is capable of stopping and
reversing the internal
processes of decay. Can the West renew itself or will
sustained internal rot
simply accelerate its end and/or subordination to
other economically and
demographically more dynamic civilizations? I feel
that in the short term it is
clearly in the interest of the West to promote
greater cooperation and unity
within its own civilization, particularly
between its European and North
American components; to incorporate into
the West.