Anarchy
Anarchy is seen as one end of the spectrum whose other end is marked by
the
presence of a legitimate and competent government. International politics
is
described as being spotted with pieces of government and bound with
elements of
community. Traditionally, international-political systems are
thought of as
being more or less anarchic. Anarchy is taken to mean not just
the absence of
government but also the presence of disorder and chaos.
Although far from
peaceful, international politics falls short of unrelieved
chaos, and while not
formally organized, it is not entirely without
institutions and orderly
procedures. Although it is misleading to label
modern international politics as
anarchic, the absence of a universal
international law prohibits well-regulated
behavior. But, international
regulation is not completely absent from world
politics. With the end of the
Cold War, the ground seems ready for an
acceleration of this century’s trend
in increasing international regulation of
more issues once typically seen as
part of state domestic jurisdiction. But as
international law embraces new
actors and a growing range of forms, topics, and
technologies, and as it
moves further away from strictly "foreign"
concerns to traditionally domestic
areas, its proponents must increasingly
confront new obstacles head-on.
Traditionally, most rules of international law
could be found in one of two
places: treaties or customary law (uncodified, but
equally binding rules
based on long-standing behavior). But as new domains from
the environment to
the Internet come to be seen as appropriate for international
regulation,
states are sometimes reluctant to embrace any sort of binding rule.
Today
all but the most doctrinaire of scholars see a role for so-called
soft
law-precepts emanating from international bodies that conform in some
sense to
expectations of required behavior but that are not binding on states
(the World
Bank’s Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investment, for example).
Soft law principles also represent a starting
point for new hard law, which
attaches a penalty to noncompliance. Whether in
the case of hard or soft law,
new participants are making increased demands
for representation in
international bodies, conferences, and other legal
groupings and processes. They
include both recognized and unrecognized
substate entities (Hong Kong and Tibet,
for example); nongovernmental
organizations; and corporations. Scholars accept
that these other actors have
independent views that do not fit neatly into
traditional theories of how law
is made and enforced. Most states comply with
much, even most, international
law. But without a mechanism to bring
transgressors into line, international
law is "law" in name only. The
traditional toolbox to secure compliance with
the law of nations consist of
negotiations, mediation, countermeasures, or,
in rare cases, recourse to
supranational judicial bodies such as the
International Court of Justice. For
many years, these tools have been
supplemented by the work of international
institutions, whose reports and
resolutions often help "mobilize
shame" against violators. But today, states,
NGO’s, and private entities
have striven for sanctions. And the UN’s ad hoc
criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda show that it is at
least possible to devise
institutions to punish individuals for human rights
atrocities. Nonetheless, the
success of these enforcement mechanisms depends
on the willingness of states to
support them. When global institutions do not
work, regional bodies may offer
more influence over member conduct in
economics, human rights, and other areas.
In addition, domestic courts
increasingly provide an additional venue to enforce
international law. Even
with a defined international law and a "world
government" to enforce it,
cooperation in general, in international politics,
is troubled. Research on
international regimes moved from attempts to describe
the phenomena of
interdependence and international regimes to closer analysis of
the
conditions under which countries cooperate. How does cooperation occur
among
sovereign states and how do international institutions affect it?
Indeed, why
should international institutions exist at all in a world
dominated by sovereign
states? This question seemed unanswerable if
institutions were seen as opposed
to or above, the state but not if they were
viewed as devices to help states
accomplish their objectives. The new school
of thought argued that, rather than
imposing themselves on states,
international institutions should respond to the
demand by states for
cooperative ways to fulfill their own purposes. By reducing
uncertainty and
the costs of making and enforcing agreements, international
institutions help
states achieve collective gains. This new institutionalism was
not without
its critics, who focused their attacks on two perceived
shortcomings. The
counterargument focused on the absence of a world government
or effective
international legal system to which victims of injustice can
appeal. Second,
theorists of cooperation had recognized that cooperation is not
harmonious:
it emerges out of discord and takes place through tough
bargaining.
Nevertheless, they claimed that the potential joint gains
from such cooperation
explained the dramatic increases in the number and
scope of cooperative
multilateral institutions. Critics pointed out, however,
that bargaining
problems themselves could produce obstacles to achieving
joint gains.
Cooperation requires recognition of opportunities for the
advancement of mutual
interest, as well as policy coordination once these
opportunities have been
identified. Transaction and information costs are
high. The complexity of
international politics militates against
identification and realization of
common interest. Avoiding nuclear war
during the Cuban missile crisis called for
cooperation by the Soviet Union
and the United States. The transaction and
information costs in the crisis,
though substantial, did not preclude
cooperation. By contrast, the problem of
identifying significant actors,
defining interests, and negotiating
agreements that embodied mutual interests in
the case of 1914 was far more
difficult. There was no common procedure to handle
the situation or resolve
it in an efficient manner. In international politics,
the likelihood of
autonomous defection and of recognition and control problems
increases.
Cooperative behavior rests on calculations of expected utility -
merging
discount rates, payoff structures, and anticipated behavior of other
players.
Nations dwell in perpetual lawlessness, for no central authority with
a
defined law limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common
condition
gives rise to diverse outcomes. War and concert, arms races and
arms control,
trade wars and tariff truces, financial panics and rescues,
competitive
devaluation and monetary stabilization mark relations among
states. At times,
the absences of centralized international authority
preclude attainment of
common goals. Because, as states, they cannot cede
ultimate control over their
conduct to a world government, they cannot
guarantee that they will adhere to
their commitments. The possibility of a
breach of promise can impede cooperation
even when cooperation would leave
all well off. Yet, at other times, states do
realize common goals though
cooperation under lawlessness. Despite the absence
of any ultimate
international law, governments often bind themselves to mutually
advantageous
courses of action. And, though no international sovereign stands
ready to
enforce the terms of agreement, modern states can and do realize
common
interests through tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and
multilateral
negotiation, and the creation if international regimes.